DMARC does only one thing (but pretty well)

DMARC (specifically, DMARC with a p=reject policy) does one thing: It makes it very difficult for somebody to use your domain in a from address without your permission. It doesn't stop spam from open relays, open proxies, snowshoeing network blocks, nor does it prevent people from ignoring CAN-SPAM and continuing to mail you after you have unsubscribed.

It doesn't do all those other things; but the one thing it does, it seems to do it very well.

It has limitations; yes. It doesn't specifically do anything the cousin domain problem (deceptively-registered domains with similar, but not exactly the same names). It makes mailing list management more complex. And it makes it so for the most part, users of email service providers (ESPs) cannot use Yahoo or AOL addresses as from addresses (because Yahoo and AOL publish strict DMARC policies).

Is anybody saying that DMARC is a magic bullet? I don't think so, but a better question is -- Does DMARC help? Yes, says Yahoo.

But spammers eventually moved on to forging one of Yahoo's domains, so it was a pointless exercise, others have said. Pointless exercise? I don't agree with that at all. It's true that Yahoo only published a strict policy for one of their domains; it's almost like they decided to lock only one door first, either because it was the most abused, or perhaps because you have to start somewhere (and maybe want to see how that goes before adding others).

But if I were a Yahoo or AOL, or a financial institution, or well known retail brand, would I think it is a win; a gain, quite likely a long term one, if I could keep bad guys away from using my domain in the from address of their bad mail? Yes, I would. DMARC helps. And I think when you look at who is implementing DMARC, I suspect that I'm not the only one who feels that way.

This reminds me so much of the days when I first got involved in spam fighting. Open relaying mail servers were a big bad problem. Spammers exploited them regularly and with great vigor. I was so tired of dealing with spam from open relaying mail servers that I started to block it, an effort that ended up becoming the MAPS Relay Spam Stopper, a coordinated third party blacklist that easily allowed mail system administrators to block mail from open relaying mail servers.

Spammers cried about being blocked. But not just spammers; there were also a non-zero number of people who claimed that I was part of some big conspiracy to wreck email. People called my employer, trying to get me fired. A number of people threatened to sue. A few high-profile savvy internet users like John Gilmore, explained that they needed to be able to legitimately relay mail for other people, and that blocking mail from those servers was akin to censorship.

Somehow, we survived all of that. Eventually, people seemed to accept this change. We got to a point where, while you do still see open relays out there from to time, there's a general consensus that it's a bad way to configure a mail server. But for us to get there, a number of us had to first band together and take action; personally implementing policies wherein we block mail from misconfigured servers used to shovel abusive, unwanted mail, while people who didn't understand why it mattered gave us hell for at the time.

I find a lot of parallel there; my point, other than I'm old and 1998 was a long time ago, is that I have a feeling that this will be a non-issue in a few years, and even if sites don't broadly implement DMARC with a p=reject policy, enough of them will do so that you're truly going to have to just deal with it.
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